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Abstract
This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’
design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference,
have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones
and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in
inferential, inductive design arguments.
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1 Plantinga’s claim about design arguments
Professor Plantinga, in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies:
Science, Religion, and Naturalism (2011), claims that design ar-
guments for the existence of God are best construed, not as in-
ferences from premises to conclusions, but as ‘design discourses’
which produce beliefs in design. Reading texts with design argu-
ments, like William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802) or Michael
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Behe’s book Darwin’s Black Box (1996), produces or recalls in
many readers the impression and the belief that God has ‘de-
signed’ the animals. This belief, like perceptual beliefs, can have
‘a great deal of warrant or positive epistemic status for you, even
if you don’t know of any good argument from other beliefs for
the belief in question – even, indeed, if there aren’t any good
arguments of that sort.’ (249)
In this article I shall criticise Plantinga’s claim that basic
design beliefs have more positive epistemic status than non-basic
ones. Further, I shall defend Paley’s and Behe’s argument against
Plantinga’s objections and suggest that probabilistic reasoning is
useful and rational also here. I shall proceed as follows:
• Oﬀer a definition of ‘intervention’.
• Raise objections against Plantinga’s divine collapse-causation
view.
• Criticise Plantinga’s claim that basic design beliefs have
more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones.
• Defend Behe’s argument against Draper’s and Plantinga’s
objection.
• Criticise Plantinga’s claim that we cannot evaluate the
probabilities involved Behe’s design argument.
2 Guided evolution, design, and interventions
In order to formulate or evaluate design arguments, we need
a clear idea of a divine intervention. Plantinga, in this book,
avoids expressing a view on whether and where God’s creating
the universe involved any divine interventions, presumably be-
cause Christians are not committed to one or the other view. He
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aﬃrms that the universe is ‘designed’ and that, if there was evolu-
tion, then it was ‘guided’, but he uses both these terms in so wide
senses that they do not imply divine interventions. What a di-
vine intervention is Plantinga defines only tentatively. He clearly
rejects attempts to rule out the possibility of interventions, e. g.
by the ‘Divine Action Project’, but he does not present a clear
definition or characterization of divine interventions.
In my view, we can sharpen our ordinary idea of a divine
intervention by linking it to the notion of a causal process. I
assume that there are causal processes, for example a tidal wave
is or is constituted by a causal process. Causal processes have a
direction, they are heading in a certain direction. For example,
20 minutes after the earthquake in Chile on 27 February 2010
there was an tsunami wave heading towards Constitución. So
there was then a causal process with a direction towards the
tsunami hitting Constitución 10 minutes later. The direction
of a process need not be spacial: the increasing pressure in a
volcano for example is a process directed towards an eruption.
A process can be stopped (or, if you prefer, changed or deflec-
ted). For example: if billiard ball A is hit by billiard ball B, then
the process of A’s rolling is stopped. In my view, every process
can be stopped and there are thus no deterministic processes in
the usual Hobbesian and Laplacean sense, but nevertheless they
have a direction into which they are going unless something stops
them.1
A divine intervention is an event brought about by God di-
rectly which is incompatible with2 an event towards which a
1This refers to non-probabilistic processes. A probabilistic process is spe-
cial in that it may go one way or another without there being a cause of it
going the way it does.
2In order to take into account the case of God causing directly an event
which would have occurred without the intervention too, we need to add
here: ‘or exactly similar to’.
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physical process, a process consisting solely of things located in
the universe, was directed. As it is not the result of a causal
process, it has no complete preceding cause. It stops a causal
process. By God ‘bringing about the event directly’ I mean that
the event has no preceding cause but its occurrence is due to
the agent. We can say that it is the decision or choice of the
agent, wherefore I call it a ‘choice event’. In my view, not only
God but also humans and animals can bring about choice events.
Furthermore, not only agents but also causal processes can in-
tervene into a causal process. When a billiard ball hits another
one, that is an intervention too, although not by an agent but by
a non-living thing. A further diﬀerence is that the two billiard
balls can be taken to constitute one process, which then contains
two process one of which intervenes in the other, while when God
intervenes there is no process directed towards the intervention.
(For more on this, see Wachter 2003 and Wachter 2009.)
3 Is Plantinga an occasionalist?
Let us consider Plantinga’s view of God’s action in the world.
Discussing what an intervention is, instead of giving a defini-
tion or description of a divine intervention, Plantinga puts for-
ward tentatively a view that he calls ‘divine collapse-causation’
(DDC):
[F]or any collapse [of a wave function] and the resulting
eigenstate, it is God who causes that state to result. [. . . ]
God is always acting specially, that is, always acting in
ways that go beyond creation and conservation. (116)
Plantinga considers the obvious objection: ‘But doesn’t this
result in divine determinism, perhaps even occasionalism, in that
God really causes whatever happens at the macro-level?’ Plantinga’s
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reply is in my view quite true, but not a reply to the objection.
He writes:
Just as it could be that God causes collapse-outcomes and
does so freely, so it could be that we human beings, du-
alistically conceived, do the same thing. Suppose human
beings, as the vast bulk of the Christian tradition has sup-
posed, resemble God in being immaterial souls or selves,
immaterial substances—with this diﬀerence: in their case
but not in his, selves intimately connected with a partic-
ular physical body. Suppose, further, God has endowed
human selves (and perhaps other agents as well) with the
power to act freely, freely cause events in the physical
world. In the case of human beings, this power could be
the power to cause events in their brains and hence in their
bodies, thus enabling them to act freely in the world. And
suppose, still further, the specific proximate events human
beings can cause are quantum collapse-outcomes. The
thought would be that God’s action constitutes a theatre
or setting for free actions on the part of human beings
and other persons—principalities, powers, angels, Satan
and his minions, whatever. God sets the stage for such
free action by causing a world of regularity and predict-
ability; but he causes only some of the collapse-outcomes,
leaving it to free persons to cause the rest. (119f)
Is DCC occasionalist? Plantinga does not clearly answer this
question, but I think it is not. Occasionalism is the view that
all events are not the result of causal processes but the result of
God’s, or some other agent’s, direct action. DCC assumes that
God and other agents cause directly only the eigenstates that
result from the collapse of the wave functions. The wave function
before the collapse presumably represents a causal process which
God sustains and which contains states that God does not cause
directly.
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Does Plantinga think that God’s causing a collapse-outcome is
an intervention? He does not answer this question, but there are
two ways to spell out DCC here. First, a defender of DCC might
say that God’s causing a collapse-outcome is an intervention,
presumably an intervention into a probabilistic process. We can
call this the quantum intervention view. Second, a defender of
DCC might negate this and say instead that each process leading
to the collapse of the wave function simply ends there, without
anything intervening. God would have to re-create matter after
each collapse. We can call this the re-creation view.
To the quantum intervention view I would object this: Why
does God intervene at each collapse of a wave function? If God
causes directly a collapse-outcome, that is an intervention into
the probabilistic process even if the process would have led, with
some probability, to the same event. And why does God never
intervene at other points? Further, does not the evidence suggest
that there are at the quantum level probabilistic processes, with
the various possible outcomes having certain probabilities? That
suggests that God does not intervene at each collapse.
To the re-creation view, I would object that there are reasons
for God to give matter the power to persist for longer. DCC, as
opposed to occasionalism, implies already that there is secondary
causation, i. e. that there are material causal processes. Some
material states of aﬀairs are caused by preceding material states
of aﬀairs while God sustains them. They are not brought about
by God directly. So causation through created things is possible.
Why then should God make matter so that it ceases to exist at
each collapse of a wave function? A material world that persists
so that it does not need frequent re-creation seems more beautiful
and more ingenious. Furthermore, it allows humans and animals
to foreknow the probable consequences of their actions without
God’s interventions being required.
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Many authors think that God (as well as men and animals)
can act freely only, or especially well, in probabilistic situations,
for example in the collapse of a wave function. Usually they
think that because they have an idea of processes that stems
from determinism as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant believed in it.
On this view, non-probabilistic processes are non-stoppable. But
there is no reason to believe in non-stoppable processes. Also
non-probabilistic processes can be stopped by material processes
as well as by animals and humans. (As argued in Wachter 2012.)
The idea that God has endowed human beings with the power to
cause freely events in the physical world, as Plantinga sketches it
in the passage quoted above, is better spelled out as follows: God
created a material world in which created things can cause (thus
there are ‘causae secundae’) and depend on being sustained by
God. There are therefore material causal processes, which give
rise to causation as well as to persisting things. They carry on
as long as God sustains them and nothing stops them, but they
can be stopped: by other material processes, by animals, or by
the actions of created rational embodied or disembodied persons,
or by God.
4 Plantinga’s view on design arguments
Now we can examine Plantinga’s position on design arguments.
In honor of the philosopher William Paley (1743–1805), I mean
by a Paley argument an argument for the existence of God which
claims that God has intervened at least once in order to create
some animal or a part of it when there had been some animal
already. So a Paley arguments contradicts the theory of evolu-
tion, by which I here mean the view that all animals have evolved
through natural processes from non-living matter, without any
interventions by disembodied persons like God. This sense is
wide in that it does not specify which natural processes (e. g.
8
mutation and selection) and narrow in that, unlike Darwinian
evolution, it includes the evolution of life from non-living matter.
By theistic evolution I mean the theory that processes consist-
ing only of non-living matter can create living beings and that
processes involving some living beings can create more complex
animals, and that God in creation never intervened but only
sustained things in being. Plantinga emphasises that theistic
evolution is compatible with theism.
Let me summarise Plantinga’s view on Paley arguments. He
claims (in ch. 8) that Paley’s and Behe’s arguments, taken as
arguments from certain premises to certain conclusions, are weak.
Behe argues, and illustrates with much biological detail, that
there are many parts of animals which are very unlikely to have
evolved, because they have or give an advantage in survival only if
many of their parts and properties are exactly as they are. They
are machines with many necessary parts. If one part is missing
or slightly diﬀerent, the machine does not work and thus gives no
advantage in survival. He calls such things ‘irreducibly complex
systems’. For example, the bacterial flagellum has a motor with a
rotor. The motor functions, and thus gives a survival advantage,
only if very many proteins and other parts are exactly as they
are and are in the right place. But the theory of evolution, in
order to make probable the existence of all the animals and their
parts, has to assume that all animals evolved through many small
changes each of which gave an advantage in survival.
Against Behe, Plantinga puts forward Draper’s (2002) objec-
tion, who points out that it could be that the systems Behe de-
scribes are not irreducibly complex. They might have evolved in-
directly, i. e. via systems which had some other function through
which they gave a survival advantage. Plantinga concludes that
Behe’s argument ‘is by no means airtight’. (231) He adds briefly
the objection that ‘it is hard in excelsis to say how low’ the
probability of the unguided evolution of, for example, protein
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machines is.
Plantinga claims that while design arguments are not very suc-
cessful, ‘design discourse’ produces design beliefs with ‘a great
deal’ positive epistemic status (249). Seeing some animal or read-
ing about some bacterium, often people get the impression that
it is designed. There is then, according to Plantinga, no inference
from premises to a conclusion involved. The belief is not based
on an argument or on evidence or on other beliefs. It is a ‘basic’
belief.
‘Perhaps what is going on in the arguments like Behe’s [. . . ]
can be better thought of as like what is going on in [cases] where
it is perception (or something like it) rather than argument that is
involved.’ (237) I have not discovered whether Plantinga endorses
the claim that some people’s design beliefs actually are justified
through apparent perceptions of design, but he does endorse the
more general claim that we ‘form design beliefs, at least on some
occasions, in the basic way. If so,’ according to Plantinga, ‘the
belief in question can have warrant or positive epistemic status,
indeed, a great deal of warrant or positive epistemic status for
you’. (249)
Plantinga believes that basic design beliefs have more positive
epistemic status than non-basic ones because they are subject
to fewer sorts of criticisms. Non-basic beliefs ‘can be criticised
in terms of the cogency of the argument. We can ask whether
the argument is valid, i. e., whether the conclusion really follows
from the premises; we can also ask whether the premises are true;
we can also ask whether the argument is circular, or begs the
question, or is in some other way dialectically deficient. None
of these sorts of criticism is relevant to beliefs formed in the
basic way.’ (251) If a design belief arises spontaneously, then it
has more positive epistemic status for you than if arises through
thinking about it.
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5 What is a basic belief?
I shall now criticise Plantinga’s claim that spontaneous design
beliefs, which Plantinga calls ‘basic’, have a higher epistemic
status than non-basic ones. For this I need to consider what a
basic belief is and how it can be criticised.
What is a basic belief? Consider a perceptual belief. When
Miller looks at a field and sees a cow, he comes to believe that
there is a cow. This belief is justified or supported or made more
rational or made more probable to some degree by the percep-
tual, visual experience, or by Miller’s belief in the perceptual
experience. Plantinga prefers not to use these words, instead he
says that the belief has ‘a great deal of warrant or positive epi-
stemic status’ for Miller. (248) Suppose that Miller, besides his
visual experience, has no evidence for there being a cow: he has
seen no hoof marks or cow pat, and for all he knows there is a
fence around the field. So his beliefs would rather lead him to
expect that there are no cows on the field. That is the kind of
situation to which Plantinga’s concept of a basic belief applies
(cf. Plantinga 2000, p. 83): The person has no evidence or argu-
ment at all for the belief; he does not believe that the cows on
the field explain something that he believes.
Now consider the relationship of one belief supporting another
one. Suppose that Jones sees cow pat and hoof marks in his
garden and concludes that there was a cow. Let us call his belief
that there was a cow the hypothesis, h, and Jones’ belief that
there is cow pat (or, if you prefer, the cow pat itself) the evid-
ence, e. h provides, with some probability, an explanation for e,
because the cow might well have caused the cow pat. We can
then say that e is evidence for h and that Jones inferred h from
the evidence, or that Jones believes that e makes h probable, or
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that e is evidential or inferential support for h.3
We can say about Miller’s visual experience as well as about
his belief in the cow pat that they support, justify, or make more
rational the belief in question. Only a belief is usually said to
make more probable a hypothesis, although one could say this
also about a perceptual experience.
Perceptual beliefs are not the only basic beliefs, i. e. beliefs
without inferential support. Other basic beliefs are supported by
experiences other than perceptions (or one could define ‘percep-
tion’ as wide as ‘experience’) or through intellectual (a priori)
insight (which one could include in the concept of perception)
or through memory, and you can believe something where you
do not remember how you acquired this belief. The latter case
would be an unsupported basic belief.
In my view, a belief that has perceptual or other non-inferential
support can additionally be supported by evidence. (I have not
found that Plantinga considers that possibility.) If Miller first
sees hoof marks in the field and thinks ‘It seems that cows have
entered the field’ and then sees a cow in the field, then his belief h
is supported by evidence as well as by a perceptual experience.4
So a belief can have any mixture of inferential and non-inferential
support. We could mean by a basic belief one which the person
believes not only because it is supported by evidence (and thus is
at least partially non-inferential). But Plantinga roughly means
by a basic belief one for which the person does not have inferen-
3The term ‘evidence’ (in German ‘Evidenz’) used to be used, e. g. by John
Locke, Franz von Brentano, and Edmund Husserl, for a priori, intuitive, self-
evident knowledge, while today it is, to the contrary, used for beliefs (or their
objects) that make a hypothesis probable. (For example in Swinburne 2001,
pp. 135–139.) I use ‘evidence’ only in the latter sense of inferential support,
so that support through a perceptual experience is not evidence or evidential
support.
4This is developed in more detail in Swinburne 2001, 139f.
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tial support, that is, the person does not derive it from his other
beliefs (for example through an inference to the best explana-
tion).
6 How can basic beliefs be criticised?
All beliefs can be criticised by giving counter-evidence. Further,
a belief can be criticised by objecting that it has no support.
Plantinga calls that ‘undercutting defeaters’. (165, 251–256) Dif-
ferent kinds of support have to be criticised diﬀerently. Miller’s
perceptual belief that there is a cow because he has seen it can
be criticised by suggesting that his eyes do not work properly: by
pointing out that there is an elk which one can easily mistake for
a cow, or that he is under drugs, or that there is an evil demon
who manipulates his mind. Jones’ inferential belief that there
was a cow in his garden because he has seen the hoof marks can
be criticised by suggesting a better explanation for the data: by
pointing out that an elk’s hoof marks look similar, or that Smith
had told that he intended to deceive Jones by producing marks
in the garden.
Plantinga argues that design beliefs produced by design dis-
course are not subject to criticisms of the inference because they
are basic. I reply that it is wrong to conclude from the fact that
the person does not reason step by step from premises to the con-
clusion that the belief is not subject to criticism of the inference.
It is the other way round: Examining whether a belief is subject
to criticism of an inference is one way to determine whether it is
at least partly inferential.
For example, seeing the hoof marks in his garden Jones might
immediately, without any explicit reasoning from premises to a
conclusion, have a strong impression that the marks were pro-
duced by a cow. Nevertheless his belief that there was a cow or
his belief that the marks were produced by a cow clearly is not
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basic. For two reasons: First, there is no memory and no per-
ceptual (or other) experience whose content involves a cow in his
mind. Both beliefs would be based on a perceptual experience
only if he believed to see, or in some other way to be in contact
with, a cow. They could still be basic, but if they were not based
on an experience of a cow and had no inferential support, then
they would have no support at all! Secondly, both beliefs clearly
are subject to criticisms of inference, and not subject to criticism
of the functioning of his sense organs. It is a valid criticism to
object that there is a more probable explanation for the marks
on the ground. You can say that the children yesterday produced
the marks for fun by hand, or that they brought an elk into the
garden yesterday and that elk hoof marks look similar to cow
hoof marks. This is to say that there is a better, i. e. more prob-
able explanation of the data. That is the kind of objection which
according to Plantinga does not apply to design beliefs produced
by design discourse. So some beliefs are inferential and thus not
basic although the person did not reason explicitly step-by-step
from premises to a conclusion.
Now consider design beliefs that are produced by design dis-
course. In order to defend his claim that they have a high epi-
stemic status, Plantinga should say which kind of basic beliefs
they are. Are they supported or produced by perception, or by
some other kind of experience, or by memory, or are they suppor-
ted by nothing because we have forgotten why we believe them?
Plantinga does not say. But surely this matters. First because on
this it depends how high the epistemic status of the belief is, and
secondly because on this it depends what kind of undercutting
defeater the belief is subject to. It makes epistemically a big dif-
ference whether you believe something because you (believe that
you) saw it or you have no idea why you have that belief.
The impression of design clearly is not a case of apparent
memory. We have no memories of the origin of the species. Is
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it a case of perception? In a perception something seems to the
person to be present to him, it seems to him that he is in contact
with it. Our design beliefs are never based on such an experience,
because nobody believes that he perceives God, or someone else,
designing a species or an animal. In the impression of design
it does not seem to the person that he is in contact with the
designer. That is already clear through the fact that we believe
that God did the designing a long time ago. In this design beliefs
diﬀer also from beliefs in the existence of other minds, with which
Plantinga compares design beliefs. (245) Many believe that they
perceive animals which are designed, or animals which were cre-
ated by God with or without intervention, but nobody believes
that he perceives God designing the animals. We also have no
other sort of experience of design, such as intellectual knowledge.
So if design beliefs produced by design discourse were basic,
then they would have no support at all. That does not seem to
be true either, because then we would just find ourselves with
them and not remember why and since when we have them. But
we know that we have them through design discourse, through
observing animals, and, in my view, through considering how
likely it is that all animals and plants evolved.
The trouble with basic beliefs that have no support is that
their epistemic status is low and is lowered easily by objections.
If you find yourself believing that it was Jones who built your
father’s house but cannot remember why you believe this, then
you should weaken or give up this belief as soon as your mother
tells you that it was built by Smith, or you find an invoice by
Smith, or you find out that Jones was not a builder but a philo-
sopher. Or if you find yourself believing in the theory of evolution
but do not know why you believe this, then you should weaken
or give up this belief if upon investigating the matter you find
evidence against it or only little evidence for it.
Plantinga wants to hold that design beliefs that were formed
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without inference, spontaneously, are as resilient against prob-
abilistic objections as my belief that I am seeing my old friend
White over there is resilient against the objection that I have not
seen White for a long time and that White is living in China.
Perceptual experiences make it rational to believe things that
otherwise, on the basis of what we know or believe, would be
quite improbable. Of course, also the probability of perceptual
beliefs is aﬀected to some degree by the person’s other beliefs. I
should trust my perceptual experience of a normal cow more than
my (equally clear) perceptual experience of a cow with a trunk
and antlers at another occasion. But perceptual experiences, de-
pending on how unambiguous they are, can make for a person
a proposition very probable that on his other beliefs would be
improbable. However, we do not have perceptual experiences of
God designing animals or plants. While Plantinga claims that
design beliefs which arise spontaneously have a higher epistemic
status than others, they have in fact a lower one. They would
have a higher one only if they were based on a clear perceptual
experience.
I conclude that, against Plantinga, design beliefs that arise
spontantously through design discouse, without the person con-
sidering the probabilities of possible explanations, have a lower
epistemic status than design beliefs that are based on such con-
siderations.
7 Draper’s objections to Behe’s argument
Now I want to defend Paley arguments against Draper’s objec-
tion, which Plantinga endorses. It is of course true that some-
thing could evolve indirectly, i. e. via things that have diﬀerent
functions. But Draper and Plantinga have done nothing to show
that this raises the probability of the theory of evolution signific-
antly. Perhaps Behe could have done more in order to show that
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it is improbable that some or all of the complex systems which
he presents have evolved indirectly. But certainly his descrip-
tions of the complex systems do this to some degree. They give
the reader new knowledge about biological systems and about
how many things in nature have and require many parts that
are fit exactly for the function that they have. For example, if
the bacterial flagellum were to have evolved, then very many of
its parts would have had some other function before they came
together to form the bacterial flagellum. But many of its parts
seem to be made exactly for the flagellum and to have no other
function. Therefore, even if Behe did not discuss indirect evol-
ution explicitly, the probability that some or even all complex
systems which exist evolved seems low even if we consider the
possibility of indirect evolution.
Draper, however, only points to the mere possibility of indirect
evolution, without considering any real examples and biological
research. That diminishes the strength of Behe’s arguments only
insignificantly.
Plantinga writes that Draper has shown ‘that Behe’s conclu-
sion doesn’t deductively follow from his premises’ and that Behe’s
argument ‘is by no means airtight’. (231) I wonder why Plantinga
thinks that Behe wanted to propose an airtight argument with
a conclusion that follows deductively from premisses. Of course
they are not airtight and not deductive. The sets of sentences
that modern logic books call ‘deductive arguments’ are deduct-
ive inferences, but most cases of what we call ‘arguments’ in
science or every day life, arguments that really aﬀect beliefs, con-
tain steps that are in some sense inductive. Ordinary arguments
suggest that something is evidence for the hypothesis. From
this point of view, Plantinga’s statement ‘that Behe’s conclusion
doesn’t deductively follow from his premises’ and that Behe’s
argument ‘is by no means airtight’ is trivial and no objection.
Not only does Plantinga not assume, as I would, that the argu-
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ments that are worth discussing are all probabilistic, but he even
often ignores the possibility of probabilistic arguments. For ex-
ample when he concludes: ‘[T]he real significance of Behe’s work,
as I see it, is not that he has produced incontrovertible arguments
for the conclusion that these systems have been designed; it is
rather that he has produced several design discourses.’ (258) So
Plantinga considers whether Behe has ‘produced incontrovertible
arguments’ and whether he has produced ‘design discourses’, but
he ignores what clearly is Behe’s intention: to provide evidence
against, and thus diminish the probability of, the theory of evol-
ution.
Similarly, when considering in general how arguments can be
criticised, Plantinga mentions only the following: ‘[A belief formed
as the conclusion of an argument] can be criticized in terms of
the cogency of the argument. We can ask whether the argu-
ment is valid, i. e., whether the conclusion really follows from the
premises; we can also ask whether the premises are true; we can
also ask whether the argument is circular, or begs the question,
or is in some other way dialectically deficient.’ (251) Again, he
does not consider the possibility of objecting to an argument that
the premises fail to make the conclusion more probable or that
the suggested evidence fails to support the hypothesis. He seems
to ignore that many arguments are not meant to be deductive,
that beliefs have probabilities and degrees of strength, and that
weighing evidence has a central role in rational belief formation.
Surely, even if an externalist theory of knowledge, as Plantinga
defends it, is true, probabilistic reasoning exists and plays an
important role in our search for truth. Although Plantinga has
so strongly attacked classical foundationalism, apparently he has
not rejected the non-probabilistic, digital epistemology that clas-
sical foundationalists generally had.
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8 Against Plantinga, we can and should consider
how probable the theory of evolution is
Plantinga rejects probabilistic Paley arguments saying that ‘it is
hard in excelsis to say how low’ the probability of the existence
of protein machines on the assumption of unguided evolution is.
(235) Similarly, he says about the fine-tuning argument for the
existence of God that it ‘oﬀers some slight support for theism’
(224). Plantinga seems to be sceptical about probabilistic argu-
ments in general. I want to criticise this scepticism.
If probabilistic reasoning were unreliable, then detectives and
scientists could not evaluate the probability of their hypotheses
as they do, or their beliefs about the probability of the hypo-
theses would be wrong or unjustified. They often believe that a
certain person did a certain action where this belief is supported
through evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA analysis. They ar-
rive at these beliefs not in the basic way which Plantinga favours
but by considering the probability of various explanations of the
evidence. We generally assume that such probabilistic reasoning
is the right method and that it leads to justified and true beliefs.
We can often work out suﬃciently well how strongly some item
of evidence supports a hypothesis.
Why does Plantinga say that ‘it is hard in excelsis to say how
low’ the probability of the existence of protein machines on the
assumption of unguided evolution is? Behe’s book and many
other texts about the protein machines do much to show that the
probability of the existence of protein machines on the theory of
evolution is much lower than on theism. They do this by showing
how complex protein machines are.
We evaluate such probabilites by considering what causes what.
We know relatively much about what causes what. Even without
detailed scientific knowledge we know that unless something holds
them apples fall down from the tree, that water does not turn
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into wine, and that dead men do not become alive again if no
god re-animates them. Behe’s and others’ detailed knowledge
about protein machines confirms what we are inclined to believe
anyway: that there are no processes that would create such com-
plicated machines.
Imagine you walk along the beach and see two hearts drawn
in the sand at the beach. Why are you are justified in believing
that someone drew them? You know, even without detailed re-
search, that it is very unlikely that a natural process, such as the
water flowing over the sand, brings about such hearts. Further
you know that human beings occasionally draw that sort of thing
into the sand. Thus you know that the probability of the hearts
having been produced by natural processes is much lower than
them having been produced intentionally by human beings. You
know this even though you know nothing about the character
and the motive of the person. There is of course the possibility
that there is a kind of natural process, hitherto unknown, which
might well produce hearts in the sand, but it would be a mistake
to say that we cannot say how low the probability of a natural
process having produced the hearts is. We know enough about
the natural processes involving sand at the beach in order to
have relatively much reason to believe that that probability is
very low. One can disagree about the exact way how our induct-
ive reasoning can be reconstructed, for example about whether
subjective or objective Bayesianism or some other approach is
more adequate. But it would certainly be wrong to deny that
we can draw justified conclusions about whether a person or a
natural process caused something.
It seems that similarly we know that it is much more prob-
ably that protein machines were produced by divine interven-
tion than that they were produced by natural processes. All the
details about protein machines that Behe and others have dis-
covered give further support to this because they make it very
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unlikely that they could be brought about by gradual changes.
Of course, one can give objections against this claim: For ex-
ample, one could try to point to certain processes which might
well produce such machines, or one could try to use the claim
that we have never seen God intervening in order to criticise the
inference. But Plantinga just says that ‘we don’t have a very
good grasp of [. . . ] those probabilities’. That is wrong, because
we have done much research about evolutionary processes and
about protein machines, and the hypothesis of theism contains
more detail about God’s abilities, character, and motives than
our beliefs about other people. Behe just infers, probabilistically
of course, to ‘an intelligent designer’. Even that inference is well
justified. If you take theism as the hypothesis, with a God who
is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good, the probability of
a divine intervention is yet higher than that of just someone’s
intervention.
I conclude that Plantinga oﬀers no good reason for saying that
‘it is hard in excelsis to say how low’ the probability of the ex-
istence of protein machines on the assumption of unguided evol-
ution is and for his skepticism about design arguments.
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